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Abstract. In healthcare, robots are increasingly being used to provide a high 
standard of care in the near future. When machines interact with humans, we 
need to ensure that these machines take into account patient autonomy. Auton-
omy can be defined as negative autonomy and positive autonomy. We present a 
moral reasoning system that takes into account this twofold approach of auton-
omy. In simulation experiments, the system matches the decision of the judge in 
a number of law cases about medical ethical decisions. This may be useful in 
applications where robots need to constrain the negative autonomy of a person 
to stimulate positive autonomy, for example when attempting to pursue a pa-
tient to make a healthier choice. 
Keywords: Moral Reasoning, Machine Ethics, Cognitive Modeling, Cognitive 
Robotics, Health Care Applications 
1 Introduction 
In view of increasing intelligence and decreasing costs of artificial agents and robots, 
organizations increasingly use such systems for more complex tasks. In healthcare, 
the use of robots is necessary to provide a high standard of care in the near future, due 
to a foreseen lack of resources and healthcare personnel [18]. By providing assistance 
during care tasks, or fulfilling them, robots can relieve time for the many duties of 
care workers. Previous research shows that robots can genuinely contribute to treat-
ment and care [4], [15], [17]. 
As their intelligence increases, the amount of human supervision decreases and robots 
increasingly operate autonomously. With this development, we increasingly rely on 
the intelligence of these robots. Because of market pressures to perform faster, better, 
cheaper and more reliably, this reliance on machine intelligence will continue to in-
crease [2].  
When we start to depend on autonomously operating robots, we should be able to rely 
on a certain level of ethical behavior from machines. As Rosalind Picard [12] nicely 
puts it: ‘‘the greater the freedom of a machine, the more it will need moral stand-
ards’’. Particularly when machines interact with humans, which they increasingly do, 
we need to ensure that these machines do not harm us or threaten our autonomy. In 
complex and changing environments, externally defining ethical rules unambiguously 
becomes difficult. Therefore, autonomously operating care robots require moral rea-
soning. We need to ensure that their design and introduction do not impede the pro-
motion of values and the dignity of patients at such a vulnerable and sensitive time in 
their lives [16]. 
 
In a recent interview in a multimillion copies free newspaper [10], we presented a 
humanoid robot for healthcare (a “Caredroid”) in which we will implement the moral 
reasoning system. The caredroid will assist people in finding suitable care, and assist 
them in making choices concerning healthcare. 
Caredroids will encounter moral dilemmas. For example, when supporting a patient in 
making choices, the caredroid should balance between accepting unhealthy choices or 
trying to persuade the patient to reconsider them. The caredroid might also have to 
consider following a previous agreement in which the patients binds himself and asks 
to be treated in case of a deterioration of the situation due to a psychiatric condition (a 
Ulysses contract) versus giving up when the patient opposes to the very treatment he 
has previously agreed upon. 
In previous research, Pontier and Hoorn [14] developed a moral reasoning system 
based on the moral principles developed by Beauchamp & Childress [5]. In simula-
tion experiments, the system was capable of balancing between conflicting principles. 
In medical ethics, autonomy is the most important moral principle [3].  
 
Often autonomy is equated with self-determination. In this view, people are autono-
mous when they are not influenced by others. However, autonomy is not just being 
free from external constraints. Autonomy can also be conceptualized as being able to 
make a meaningful choice, which fits in with one’s life-plan [8]. In this view, a per-
son is autonomous when he acts in line with well-considered preferences. This im-
plies that the patient is able to reflect on fundamental values in life. Core aspects of 
autonomy as self-determination are mental and physical integrity and privacy. Central 
in autonomy as ability to make a meaningful choice are having adequate information 
about the consequences of decision options, the cognitive capability to make deliber-
ate decisions, and the ability to reflect on the values behind one’s choices. Autonomy 
as self-determination can be called negative freedom, or ‘being free of’. Autonomy as 
the ability to make a meaningful choice is called positive freedom or ‘being free to’ 
[6]. In this paper, we will use the notions of ‘negative autonomy’ and ‘positive auton-
omy’ to denote both concepts. To be able to reflect this more complex view of auton-
omy in the moral reasoning system, we decided to expand the moral principle of au-
tonomy. 
 
The notion of positive autonomy can come close to beneficence. For example, when 
mental health is facilitated or prevented from worsening, this can be seen as facilitat-
ing beneficence, but also as facilitating requirements necessary for making a well-
considered choice. Moreover, almost any action stimulating the freedom to choose 
based on reflection can be seen as facilitating beneficence. Therefore, in the model, 
when positive autonomy is facilitated, often beneficence also increases. Yet, autono-
my as being able to make a meaningful choice is not the same as beneficence. Reflec-
tion on and deliberation about values can help people to behave in a more healthy 
way, but this is not necessarily so.  Reflection might result in people taking health risk 
in favor of other important values. An example is the conscious refusal of blood by 
Jehovah’s witnesses.  
In medical practice, a conflict between negative autonomy and positive autonomy can 
play a role. Sometimes, the self-determination of the patient needs to be constrained 
on the short-term to achieve positive autonomy on the longer term. For example, 
when a patient goes into rehab his freedom can be limited for a limited period of time 
to achieve better cognitive functioning and self-reflection in the future. 
2 The model of autonomy 
In our model we divide autonomy into negative autonomy and positive autonomy. 
Negative autonomy can be seen as self-determination - or being free of others - and 
consists of the sub-principles physical integrity, mental integrity and privacy. Positive 
autonomy can be seen as the capability to make a deliberate decision – or being free 
to choose - and consists of having adequate information, being cognitively capable of 
making a deliberate decision and reflection. The model of autonomy is graphically 
depicted in Figure 1. All variables in the model are represented by a value in the do-




Fig. 1. The Model of Autonomy 
 
To be autonomous, both the conditions for positive autonomy and negative autonomy 
are relevant. Ideally, both are present to a large extent. When self-determination is 
compromised, one is not able to make an autonomous decision, because this decision 
is made by others; the person is not free of others to make an own decision. When a 
person is not able to deliberate, the person is also not autonomous. The person may be 
free of others to make a decision, but not free to make an autonomous decision, due to 
a lack of capabilities to do so. This is reflected in the formula below to calculate the 
level of autonomy.  
 
Autonomy = Positive_autonomy * Negative_autonomy 
 
When negative autonomy - or self-determination - is 0, autonomy will also be 0. 
When positive autonomy – or the capability to make a deliberate decision – is 0, au-
tonomy will also be 0. For being autonomous, both negative autonomy and positive 
autonomy need to have a high value. 
 
Positive autonomy can be divided in having adequate information, cognitive function-
ing and reflection. For calculating positive autonomy from these three variables, we 
use the same reasoning as for calculating autonomy. Each should be present to some 
extent; the higher one of them, the more autonomy. Without any information about 
the consequences of a decision, it does not matter whether one could have made a 
well-reflected deliberate decision while having this information. When one is severely 
mentally handicapped, it does not matter whether adequate information is available. 
When a decision is made without reflection, it does not matter whether one would 
have the cognitive capabilities and information to do so. The formula for calculating 
positive autonomy is similar to that for calculating autonomy. 
 
Positive_Autonomy = Information * Cognitive_Functioning * Reflection 
 
When one of the three variables is 0, positive autonomy will also be 0. For being ca-
pable of making a well-reflected, deliberate decision, all conditions for positive au-
tonomy need to be met to a certain extent. 
 
Negative autonomy is divided into physical integrity, mental integrity and privacy. 
For calculating negative autonomy, or self-determination, a different method is cho-
sen. If privacy is constrained, but physical and mental integrity are left intact, the 
level of self-determination can be higher than the level of privacy alone. For calculat-
ing negative autonomy, a weighed sum of the three variables is taken, as can be seen 
in the formula below. 
 
Negative autonomy = wp*Privacy + wm *Mental_Integrity + wph *Physical_Integrity;  
 
For normalization, the three weights sum up to 1. The values chosen for the three 
weights can be found in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Weights for components of negative autonomy  
 
Component of Negative Autonomy Ambition level 
Privacy 0.20 
Mental Integrity 0.30 
Physical Integrity 0.50 
 
 
When making a decision that may influence the autonomy of a patient, the robot will 
make an estimation of how each of the six variables will change. After doing so, the 
robot can calculate the resulting autonomy of the patient for every possible decision 
option. Using the previously developed moral reasoning system [14] the robot can use 
the outcome to estimate how morally good or bad every decision option is. The calcu-
lated level of autonomy simply feeds into ‘autonomy’ in the moral reasoning system 
for calculating the morality of each action. The moral reasoning system including the 
twofold approach of autonomy is graphically depicted in Figure 2. 
The agent calculates estimated level of morality of an action by taking the sum of the 
ambition levels of the three moral principles multiplied with the beliefs that the par-
ticular actions facilitate the corresponding moral principles. When moral principles 
are believed to be better facilitated by an action, the estimated level of Morality will 
be higher. The following formula is used to calculate the estimated Morality of an 
action: 
 
Morality(Action) =  
Goal( Belief(facilitates(Action, Goal)) * Ambition(Goal)) 
 
 
Fig. 2. The Moral Reasoning System 
3 Simulation Results 
Previously, we developed Pontier and Hoorn [14] developed a moral reasoning sys-
tem that matched the conclusions of expert ethicists. To control whether the current 
system, including the twofold approach of autonomy, matches the behavior of the 
previous system, we repeated one of the previously performed simulation experi-
ments. Additionally, we simulated three law cases of the period 2008-2012 in the 
Netherlands, to test whether the decisions of the model match those of the judge. 
Experiment: Patient refuses to take medication due to false beliefs 
A patient with incurable cancer refuses chemotherapy that will let him live a few 
months longer, relatively pain free. He refuses the treatment because, ignoring the 
clear evidence to the contrary, he is convinced himself that he is cancer-free and does 
not need chemotherapy. 
According to Buchanan and Brock [7], the ethically preferable answer is to try again. 
The patient’s less than fully autonomous decision will lead to harm (dying sooner) 
and denies him the chance of a longer life (a violation of the duty of beneficence), 
which he might later regret. The moral reasoner comes to the same conclusion, as can 
be seen in Table 2. 
In this and the following tables, the fields under the moral principles and 
subprinciples represent the believed facilitation of the corresponding moral principle 
by an action. ‘Prv’ stands for Privacy, ‘MI’ for Mental Integrity, ‘PhI’ for Physical 
Integrity, ‘Info’ for Adequate Information, ‘CF’ for Cognitive Functioning, ‘Ref’ for 
Reflection, ‘A+’ for Positive Autonomy, ‘A-’ for Negative Autonomy, ‘Aut’ for Au-
tonomy, ‘NM’ for Non-Maleficence, ‘B’ for Beneficence. Justice did not play a role 
in any of the cases and is therefore set to 0 in all simulations. In Table 2, ‘Try’ stands 
for the decision option ‘Try again’, whereas ‘Acc’ stands for ‘Accept’. 
 
Table 2. Simulation results of the example experiment 
 
 Prv MI PhI Info  CF Ref A- A+ Aut NM B Mor 
Try .80 .50 1.0 .50 .50 .50 .81 .50 .64 .75 .75 .70 
Acc 1.0 1.0 1.0 .10 .30 .30 1.0 .21 .46 .25 .25 .35 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, the moral reasoner with the twofold approach of autonomy 
also classifies the action ‘Try again’ as having a higher level of morality than accept-
ing the decision of the patient.  
 
To test whether the behavior of the model matches actual decisions made by judges in 
the area of health law, we simulated a number of law cases of the period 2008-2012 in 
the Netherlands [8]. In these cases, there was a conflict between negative autonomy 
and positive autonomy, and beneficence and non-maleficence. 
Case 1: Assertive outreach to prevent judicial coercion 
In case 1, a man is not taking care of himself and in a state of demise. There is risk of 
fire and aggression to others. The judge decides the man has a quite serious disturb-
ance, bet the situation does not justify judicial coercion. Although the man was living 
isolated, the situation was not worsening. The care-takers could continue offering 
care, and if necessary make use of assertive outreach. The Court agreed with this 
decision. Although the situation of this man was slowly declining, there was no acute 
danger and time enough for attempts to pursue the man to voluntarily accept care. 
Assertive outreach could be offered to prevent further worsening of the man’s situa-
tion. Thereby, a future need for judicial coercion could possibly be prevented.  
This legal argument is reflected in the simulation of this case, as can be seen in Table 
3. In Table 3, ‘NI’ stands for the decision option ‘No Intervention’, ‘AO’ stands for 
‘Assertive Outreach’ and ‘JC’ stand for ‘Judicial Coercion’.  
With no intervention at all, self-determination is well respected (self-determination = 
1.0). However, it does not improve the worrisome situation of the man (beneficence = 
0) and there is a risk of worsening of the situation for the man (non-maleficence = 
0.30). Still, no intervention at this moment (morality = 0.41) is a slightly ethically 
better option than judicial coercion (morality = 0.40). Through judicial coercion, self-
determination is heavily violated (self-determination = 0.20). The ethically best op-
tion in this case was to offer assertive outreach. Hereby, negative autonomy is not 
violated too heavily (self-determination = 0.58) and positive autonomy may be im-
proved (positive_autonomy = 0.62), leading to an overall autonomy of 0.60. With this 
relatively light intervention, the situation of the patient could possibly still be im-
proved (beneficence = 0.40; non-maleficence = 0.40), leading to an overall morality 
of 0.49.  
 
Table 3. Simulation results of case 1 
 
 Prv MI PhI Info  CF Ref A- A+ Aut NM B Mor 
NI 1.0 1.0 1.0 .50 .50 .50 1.0 .50 .71 .30 0.0 .41 
AO .40 .40 1.0 .50 .60 .80 .58 .62 .60 .40 .40 .49 
JC .20 .20 .20 .50 .60 .50 .20 .53 .33 .40 .50 .40 
Case 2: Inform care deliverers, not parents of adult 
In the second case, a psychiatrist contacted the parents of a patient who was in an 
alarming situation and was avoiding help. The patient was adult and mentally compe-
tent, and was not in good contact with his parents. Therefore, the judge decided the 
psychiatrist should have only informed the ambulatory care team, and not the parents. 
The legal judgment is in line with the simulation of the case, as can be seen in Table 
4. In Table 4, ‘NI’ stands for the decision option ‘No Intervention’, ‘ICT’ stands for 
‘Inform Care Team’ and ‘IP’ stand for ‘Inform Parents’. Informing the parents (priva-
cy = 0.10) is simulated as a heavier violation of privacy than informing the ambulato-
ry care team (privacy = 0.80). In contrast to the ambulatory care team, the parents 
could spread the information against the patients will and nag the patient. Informing 
the ambulatory care team could improve the care for the patient and thereby improve 
his cognitive functioning (cognitive functioning ‘do nothing’ = 0.50; cognitive func-
tioning ‘inform the ambulatory care team’ = 0.70). Therefore, because of its ad-
vantages for positive autonomy, informing the ambulatory care team is in this situa-
tion a better option (autonomy = 0.73) than doing nothing (autonomy = 0.71), even 
when only taking into account the principle of autonomy. 
 
Table 4. Simulation results of case 2 
 
 Prv MI PhI Info  CF Ref A- A+ Aut NM B Mor 
NI 1.0 1.0 1.0 .50 .50 .50 1.0 .50 .71 0.0 0.0 .31 
ICT .80 1.0 1.0 .50 .70 .50 .96 .56 .73 .50 0.0 .48 
IPar .10 .80 1.0 .50 .50 .50 .76 .50 .62 0.0 0.0 .27 
Case 3: Negative autonomy constrained to enhance positive autonomy 
In case3, a patient signed a self-binding declaration for judicial coercion (a so-called 
Ulysses contract) when certain circumstances would occur. The patient ran away a 
few times from addiction care and had a relapse in alcohol use. Thereby the circum-
stances of the self-binding declaration were met and, according to the judge, judicial 
coercion was justified.  
As can be seen in Table 5, the decision of the court is in line with the outcome in the 
simulation of the case. In Table 5, ‘NI’ stands for the decision option ‘No Interven-
tion’ and ‘JC’ stand for ‘Judicial Coercion after self-binding’. In the simulation, judi-
cial coercion is a violation of self-determination. However, this violation is smaller 
(self-determination case 8 = 0.40) than in previous cases, where no self-binding decla-
ration was signed (self-determination previous cases = 0.20). Moreover, without judi-
cial coercion, the patient is likely to diminish in cognitive functioning (0.20) and re-
flection (0.20) by alcohol misuse, whereas by judicial coercion cognitive functioning 
and reflection can be recovered (both 1.0) during detoxification. Therefore, even 
when looking at autonomy alone, judicial coercion is a better option (autonomy = 
0.56) than doing nothing (autonomy = 0.52). 
 
Table 5. Simulation results of case 3 
 
 Prv MI PhI Info  CF Ref A- A+ Aut NM B Mor 
NI 1.0 1.0 1.0 .50 .20 .20 1.0 .27 .52 0.0 0.0 .23 
JC .40 .40 .40 .50 1.0 1.0 .40 .79 .56 .70 .70 .63 
4 Discussion 
We presented a moral reasoning system including a twofold approach of autonomy. 
The system extends a previous moral reasoning system [14] in which autonomy con-
sisted of a single variable. The behavior of the current system matches the behavior of 
the previous system. Moreover, simulation of legal cases for courts in the Netherlands 
showed a congruency between the verdicts of the judges and the decisions of the pre-
sented moral reasoning system including the twofold model of autonomy. Finally, the 
experiments showed that in some cases long-term positive autonomy was seen as 
more important than negative autonomy on the short-term.  
Case 1 showed that, both according to the judge and to the model, assertive outreach 
could be an option to prevent judicial coercion. By assertive outreach, the mental 
integrity and privacy of the patient were constrained. However, this prevented wors-
ening of the situation, which would have raised the need for judicial coercion, a 
measure that more heavily constrains the privacy of the patient.  
In case 2, the psychiatrist should have informed the ambulatory care team instead of 
the parents of the patient. Informing the ambulatory care team constrained the privacy 
of the patient less than informing the parents, and had more potential to prevent wors-
ening of the situation and improve the cognitive functioning of the patient. Because of 
its advantages for positive autonomy, also when only taking into account the principle 
of autonomy, informing the ambulatory care team is in this situation a better option 
than doing nothing. Thus, in this case, constraining negative autonomy in benefit of 
positive autonomy improves the overall level of autonomy. 
Finally, case 3 showed that negative autonomy can sometimes be constrained to stim-
ulate positive autonomy. In this case, the patient had agreed to that under certain con-
ditions. Because the conditions of a self-binding declaration were met, judicial coer-
cion was justified. During detoxification, the cognitive function and reflection of the 
patient could be restored. Because of this stimulation of positive autonomy on the 
longer term, the constraints of negative autonomy on the short-term in the end posi-
tively influence the level of overall autonomy. 
 
The moral reasoning system presented in this paper can be used by robots and soft-
ware agents to prefer actions that prevent users from being harmed, improve the us-
ers’ well-being and stimulate the users’ autonomy. By adding the twofold approach of 
autonomy, the system can balance between positive autonomy and negative autono-
my. 
In future work, we intend to integrate the model of autonomy into Moral Coppélia 
[13], an integration of the previously developed moral reasoning system [14] and 
Silicon Coppélia - a computational model of emotional intelligence [9]. Adding the 
twofold model of autonomy to Moral Coppélia may be useful in many applications, 
especially where machines interact with humans in a medical context. 
After doing so, the level of involvement and distance will influence the way the robot 
tries to improve the autonomy of a patient. In long-term care, nurses tend to be rela-
tionally involved with patients, motivating them to accept care [1, 11]. A robot that is 
more involved with the patient will focus more on improving positive autonomy and 
especially on reflection. If the robot is relatively little involved with the patient, it will 
focus more on negative autonomy: physical and mental integrity and privacy. 
Acknowledgements. This study is part of the SELEMCA project within CRISP (grant 
number: NWO 646.000.003). 
5  References 
1.  Agich, G.J.: Autonomy and long-term care. Cambridge University Press (2003) 
2. Anderson, M., Anderson, S., Armen, C.: Toward Machine Ethics: Implementing Two Ac-
tion-Based Ethical Theories. In: Machine Ethics: Papers from the AAAI Fall Symposium. 
Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, Menlo Park, CA (2005) 
3. Anderson, M., Anderson, S.: Ethical Healthcare Agents, Studies in Computational Intelli-
gence, 107, Springer (2008) 
4. Banks, M.R., Willoughby, L.M., Banks, W.A.: Animal-Assisted Therapy and Loneliness in 
Nursing Homes: Use of Robotic versus Living Dogs. Journal of the American Medical Di-
rectors Association. 9, 173-177 (2008) 
5. Beauchamp, T.L., Childress, J.F.: Principles of Biomedical Ethics. New York, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press (2001) 
6. Berlin, I.: Two concepts of liberty. Oxford: Clarendon Press (1958) 
7. Buchanan, A.E. and Brock, D.W. 1989. Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Deci-
sion Making, Cambridge University Press 
8. Widdershoven G.A.M., and Abma, T.A.: Autonomy, dialogue, and practical rationality. In: 
Radoilska, L. (ed.). Autonomy and mental disorder. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 
217-232 (2012). 
9. Hoorn, J.F., Pontier, M.A., and Siddiqui, G.F.: Coppélius' Concoction: Similarity and Com-
plementarity Among Three Affect-related Agent Models. Cognitive Systems Research Jour-
nal, vol. 15-16, pp. 33-49 (2012) 
10. Karimi, A. Zorgrobot rukt op, Spits, Oct. 1, 2012, pp. 5 (2012) 
11. Moody, H.R.: Ethics in an ageing society, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins UP (1996) 
12. Picard, R.: Affective computing. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (1997) 
13. Pontier, M.A., Widdershoven, G.A.M., Hoorn, J.F.: Moral Coppélia - Combining Ratio 
with Affect in Ethical Reasoning. In: Advances in Artificial Intelligence – IBERAMIA 2012, 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 7637, pp. 442-451 (2012) 
14. Pontier, M.A., Hoorn, J.F.: Toward machines that behave ethically better than humans do 
In: Miyake, N., Peebles, B., Cooper, R.P. (eds.) Proceedings of of the 34th International An-
nual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, CogSci'12, pp. 2198-2203 (2012) 
15. Robins, B., Dautenhahn, K., Boekhorst, R.T., Billard, A.: Robotic Assistants in Therapy 
and Education of Children with Autism: Can a Small Humanoid Robot Help Encourage So-
cial Interaction Skills? Journal of Universal Access in the Information Society. 4, 105-120 
(2005) 
16. Van Wynsberghe, A.: Designing Robots for Care; Care Centered Value-Sensitive Design. 
Journal of Science and Engineering Ethics, in press (2012) 
17. Wada, K., Shibata, T.: Social Effects of Robot Therapy in a Care House. JACIII. 13, 386-
392 (2009) 
18. WHO.: Health topics: Ageing, http://www.who.int/topics/ageing/en/ (2010) 
 
